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BLONDEL, MODERN CATHOLIC THEOLOGY AND THE LEIBNIZIAN EUCHARISTIC BOND 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The category of substance is fundamental in Leibniz’s philosophy, and conceived in 
specifically theological terms in his late correspondence with Bartholomaeus des Bosses. 
The exchange develops as a discussion of the bond of substance (vinculum substantiale) 
in the transubstantiated eucharistic host, but the bond also provides the basis for a 
general theory of universal substance. This eucharistic vision of the substance of the 
world is appropriated by Maurice Blondel as the basis of his philosophy of action, in 
which divine transforming activity is necessarily implied, and which he describes as a 
form of transubstantiation of both the subject of action and its material object. This 
Leibnizian-Blondelian theology of the divine transformation of the substance of the 
world provides eucharistic foundations for modern catholic social teaching. 
 
Modern catholic theology has not sufficiently recognized its indebtedness to the ecumenical and 
universalist philosophical theology of a Hanoverian Lutheran. Gottfried Leibniz’s attempt to account for 
the consistency of the transubstantiated eucharistic host as due to Christ acting on it as the ‘bond of 
substance’ was appropriated by Maurice Blondel and provided eucharistic foundations for his 
philosophy of action. The latter profoundly shaped catholic theology through the twentieth century, but 
its eucharistic origins are rarely acknowledged. 
 
LEIBNIZ AND DES BOSSES 
 
Fundamental to René Descartes’ attempt to establish a basis for objective knowledge of the world was 
the division of reality into material being and spiritual being. An effect of this separation was that the 
possibility of the existence of individual material substances was excluded.1 Bodies of all kinds were, in 
the Cartesian universe, just various different chunks of one continuous, homogenous and extended 
material substance. The only individual substances were spiritual ones, otherwise known as minds or 
mental substances. These Cartesian distinctions provide a helpful opening onto Leibniz’s own 
understanding of substance. In several of his later works, including the Monadology, Leibniz conceives 
of substance in spiritual terms similar to those of Descartes, on the grounds that mind provides matter 
with a ‘substantial form’ to animate or inform it.2 So far as his earlier work is concerned, interpretations 
have differed. Some have identified a distinct theory of material substance there, suggesting that Leibniz 
then believed that the action of mind on matter communicated a real substantial unity to matter, the 
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unity of which would otherwise be purely phenomenal.3 Others have argued that he advocated an 
essentially Cartesian notion of substance as spiritual, rather than material, even in his early work. One 
objective of this essay is to present Leibniz as a philosopher fundamentally concerned, even in his later 
work, to develop a coherent theory of the nature of substance. 
A second larger objective can be defined. Popular reading of Leibniz has continued for too long 
in the shadow of Bertrand Russell, who presents him as the creator of a logical, self-consistent, and 
ultimately self-referential philosophical system similar but inferior to that of Spinoza.4 Many of 
Leibniz’s interpreters have also tended to posit God—in so far as they discuss this fundamental part of 
his philosophy—as a logical object needed to complete arguments about the creation, preservation and 
governance of the world. This is Procrustean treatment of episodic work, however, which finds 
expression in no single magnum opus, but is developed in many brief texts and in letters to more than 
600 different correspondents. Recent years have seen some significant work on Leibniz’s links to 
figures with theological interests, such as Ralph Cudworth, Henry More, Francis van Helmont and Anne 
Conway.5 Leibniz’s significance as an ecumenist in a period of intense religious conflict is also a topic 
in which there has been intermittent interest.6 The following examination of Leibniz’s theory of the 
bond of substance will draw attention to some of the theological and ecumenical implications of his 
philosophy, and will stake a claim for a conception of substance as a real unity of spirit and matter in 
which substance is distinct not only from matter but also from spirit, acting on them to bind them 
together. 
Scholastic tradition, with which Leibniz was imbued, had conceived the bond in more limited 
terms. As Francisco Suárez states in De causa formali substantiali: 
This mode of union is a sort of medium or chain [vinculum] between the form and the matter, 
and it, therefore, touches and affects both in some way and, hence, depends on both in its 
coming to be and in its being. As a result this mode of the rational soul, although it is in its own 
entity something spiritual, nevertheless participates in the conditions of a material thing because 
it both completely depends upon matter and is in its own way extended along with matter, 
although it does not have extension on the side of the soul.7 
Figures including José Ferrater Mora have highlighted the many continuities between the worlds of 
Suárez and Leibniz. Yet as Mora makes clear in his discussion of the vinculum substantiale, identity of 
language by no means signifies identity of meaning.8 Suárez, while denying any real distinction 
between existence and essence, sees the vinculum as educed more from the potency of soul than from 
the potency of matter. The suggestion that a non-existing essence is just as incomprehensible as an 
inessential existent can been seen as an attempt to negotiate a path between « un souci du concret » and 
« un vertige de l’abstraction ».9 Yet to Leibniz, the notion that the bond is dependent upon that which it 
bonds would ultimately be unsatisfactory. 
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Leibniz develops the concept of the bond of substance (the vinculum substantiale) in 
correspondence with the Jesuit scholar Bartholomaeus des Bosses. Leibniz had for a long time been 
aware of his affinity for Jesuits grounded in several common interests: internationalism, intellectual and 
political ambitions, theology, and anti-Cartesianism.10 The exchange of letters,  written in Latin, began 
in 1706 and continued until Leibniz’s death in 1716, with the concept itself being developed during 
1712.11 The antecedents of the vinculum can be found in a brief discussion about angelic bodies. In 
three early letters to des Bosses, written during the autumn of 1706, Leibniz lays foundations, perhaps 
unwittingly, for the discussion of transubstantiation by refuting the Thomist opinion that angels do not 
always have bodies. (It was supposed that angels assumed a body when sent on missions by God, but 
did not while attending on God.)12 In fact, Leibniz states, all spiritual beings, both angels and humans, 
need a body. The only exceptions are God, and any being in whom God miraculously supplants 
matter.13 
This concern for universal embodiment forms a prelude to the discussion of transubstantiation, 
which became the principal topic in the correspondence three years later in 1709. The eucharist had 
remained a key philosophical concern of Leibniz’s from the period of his earlier work, not least because 
the notion that the body of Christ could be in different places at the same time effectively disproved the 
Cartesian notion of substance as extension.14 Leibniz had, for a long time, wished to provide a 
philosophical demonstration of transubstantiation compatible with the Tridentine definition but using 
essentially Aristotelian categories.15 He now advances, in turn, three distinct theories of Christ’s 
presence in the eucharistic host. The first focuses on the classic problem of ‘real accidents’. In other 
words, how could the appearance of bread persist once deprived of its subject? Leibniz responds to des 
Bosses: 
If you wish the real accidents to remain without a subject, it is necessary to say that, after the 
suppression of the monads constituting the bread, including their primitive active and passive 
forces, in order to substitute for them the presence of monads constituting the body of Christ, 
there remain only the derivative forces which were in the bread and which produce the same 
phenomena as those which had produced the monads of bread.16 
In this explanation, transubstantiation therefore requires the suppression of the monads of the bread. 
Four months later, Leibniz outlines a second theory: 
Since the bread is not, in fact, a substance, but a being by aggregation, that is to say, 
substantiated from innumerable monads by the addition of a sort of Union, it is in this union that 
its substantiality consists. Also, it is not necessary ... that God abolish or change these monads, 
but only that God removes that by which they form an original being, i.e. the union itself; thus 
the substantiality which results from it will be abolished, even though the phenomenon remains, 
which from that point onwards does not originate in those monads but in something equivalent 
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to their union which is substituted for it by divine action. In that way, no substantial subject is, in 
truth, present.17 
This second account is significant in distinguishing substantiality from mere phenomenal aggregation, 
and in its identification of a union, which results from divine action, as the cause of substantiality. In 
this version, it is not the monads which are abolished, but simply their union. Both theories are, 
however, superseded by Leibniz’s definitive description of the bond of substance offered in 1712. He 
writes to des Bosses: 
I should think that your theory of transubstantiation can be explained by retaining the monads, 
which seem to fit the reason and order of the universe perfectly, but with a bond of substance 
[sic] added by God to unite the body of Christ to the monads of bread and wine, and the former 
bond of substance [sic] destroyed, and its modifications and accidents with it. Thus there would 
remain only the phenomena of the monads of bread and wine, which would have been there if no 
bond of substance had been added by God to these monads.18 
The portion of this third account dealing with the initial union between the monads of bread and wine is 
similar to the second, except that the concept of a bond of substance (vinculum substantiale) is 
introduced explicitly in order to explain the union. The part of the explanation dealing with the 
transubstantiated host is significantly different, however. In the second version, the monadic union is 
abolished and replaced with something equivalent to it which is not however itself a union. Yet in this 
third version union remains, and is indeed intensified. This union is similar to the preceding one in that 
it is caused by a bond of substance, but different in so far as it associates the monads with the body of 
Christ rather than with each other. 
When describing transubstantiation to des Bosses as ‘your theory’, Leibniz clearly distances 
himself from any personal commitment to it. Indeed, it is unlikely that Leibniz, being a Lutheran, 
himself ever espoused catholic eucharistic theology, and it is commonly accepted that during the final 
twenty years of his life he received communion just once, in Vienna in a Lutheran church during a 
plague.19 When discussing the nature of eucharistic consecration, Leibniz certainly prefers to 
understand the host as a real presence of the body of Christ received with the bread, rather than as the 
actual body of Christ. He states that the ‘Evangelicals’, i.e. the Lutherans 
teach only that, in receiving the visible symbols, we receive in an invisible and supernatural 
manner the body of our Saviour, without its being enclosed in the bread; and the presence which 
they mean is not local or spatial, so to speak... What they mean by the substance of the body 
does not consist in extension or dimension... In order to show the absurdity of their doctrine, it 
would be necessary to show that the entire essence of the body consists only in extension ... 
which no-one, so far as I know, has yet done.20 
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An understanding of the eucharist as revealing the real presence of Christ is therefore, at the very least, 
a continuing possibility of faith. Leibniz’s primary intellectual objection to transubstantiation is not 
theological but philosophical, and specifically to the notion of real accidents apparently required by the 
Tridentine definition of transubstantiation to account for the persistence of the accidents of bread and 
wine following the suppression of their substances. Descartes also, like Leibniz, rejected emphatically 
the concept of real accidents, preferring instead to interpret the form of the bread which is perceived as 
the surface common to the particles of bread and to the bodies which surround them.21 Leibniz would 
not, of course, have stated his objection in these Cartesian terms. He nevertheless obviously found it 
difficult to accept the complete severing of the relation between phenomenon and substance that the 
Council of Trent supposed, because fundamental to his metaphysics is the harmony between the 
spiritual/mental order and the material order. 
On closer examination however, Leibniz’s attitude to transubstantiation is ambivalent. He had 
stated in a letter to Arnauld that the doctrines of transubstantiation and real presence are ultimately 
identical, and speculated to des Bosses that the only way of accounting for the mystery of the 
incarnation is in terms of real bonds or unions.22 This suggests that presence and mystery cannot be 
excluded from Leibniz’s metaphysics purely on the basis that they are miraculous interventions in the 
normal order of the world. Indeed, the possibility that the miracle of transubstantiation reveals a more 
profound truth about the created order is presented by the thoroughly Thomist discussion in the 
Discourse about miracles being in conformity with the general order of the universe yet contrary to the 
subordinate rules normally operative within it.23 The effect of transubstantiation—that is, the substantial 
presence of the body of Christ as a bond—expresses, in other words, the fact that God is the true cause 
of all substances. Transubstantiation, being one aspect of the extraordinary concourse, or perpetual 
creation, of the world by God, cannot be foreseen by the reasoning of any created mind, because it 
illumines supernaturally the understanding of minds. 
In a crucial yet ambiguous passage, Leibniz describes the necessity of the bond of substance for 
establishing the reality of the composite bodies which comprise the wider created order. He writes: 
Either bodies are mere phenomena, in which case extension too will be only a phenomenon and 
only monads will be real, but the union will be supplied in the phenomenon by the action of the 
perceiving soul; or if faith [fides] urges us to assert corporeal substances, substance consists in 
that unifying reality which adds something absolute and hence substantial, even though fluid, to 
the things to be united.24 
Noteworthy here is the identification of fides as prompting belief in corporeal substances, and the 
association of substantiality with ‘something absolute ... even though fluid’. Fides does not necessarily 
designate a religious affirmation, being used to refer to a wider form of belief or plausibility as well. 
Nevertheless, in contrasting pure phenomenology with a realist notion of substance in which ‘something 
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absolute’ insinuates itself, Leibniz leaves open the suggestive metaphysical possibility that there are 
either two realisms or none: either the preservation of material substance is possible only by the action 
of an actually existing divinity; or all that exists is phenomenal and a construction of human 
consciousness, and humanity therefore has no reason affirm God’s existence. 
Leibniz defends his new conception of material substance as established neither by the monads 
themselves, nor by a dominant monad governing them, but by ‘something absolute’, in robust terms to 
des Bosses: 
If you deny that what is superadded to the monads is of the nature of a substance, you cannot say 
that a body is a substance, for it will then be a mere aggregate of monads; and I fear that you will 
fall back upon the mere phenomenality of body.25 
Leibniz continues by denying the sufficiency of his leitmotif, pre-established harmony, to account for 
material substance: 
It cannot be proven from the principle of harmony that there is anything in bodies besides 
phenomena. For we know on other grounds that the harmony of phenomena in souls does not 
arise from the influence of bodies but is pre-established. This would suffice if there were only 
souls or monads; in this case all real extension would also disappear, not to speak of real motion, 
whose reality would be reduced to mere changes in phenomena.26 
It thus becomes apparent that Leibniz is not agnostic about the choice between phenomenology and 
realism that he has presented. The reality of extension and motion as attributes of substance impel his 
reflections beyond pure phenomenology to defend a realist notion of material substance and, by 
implication, of divinity. 
 
MAURICE BLONDEL 
 
The period 1875–90 saw the publication in Berlin of Leibniz’s Philosophischen Schriften under the 
editorship of C.I. Gerhardt. This enterprise provides the immediate intellectual context for Blondel’s 
choice of the vinculum substantiale as the topic for his Latin thesis. He made this choice as early as 
1880, he explains in a letter to Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, on graduating from lycée and entering Dijon 
University where Henry Joly was delivering a course on Leibniz’s vinculum.27 Joly’s realist 
interpretation of Leibniz, and recognition of the significance of the vinculum doctrine as part of this, 
became Blondel’s own, remaining present even following the latter’s installation at the Sorbonne under 
the supervision of the prolific Émile Boutroux, whose own reading of the vinculum was idealist.28 
Leibniz’s interest in the doctrine was, as has been seen, primarily philosophical. It is clear, in contrast, 
that Blondel’s choice of topic was motivated by spiritual concerns just as much as by intellectual ones. 
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Daily communion was of foundational importance in his religious life throughout his years of doctoral 
study, in stark contrast with Leibniz’s decades of estrangement from the sacrament.29 
Blondel explores in his thesis how the bond of substance reveals the limits of Leibniz’s later 
idealism.30 This interpretation of Leibniz has been marginal in much recent interpretation, yet Blondel 
regards it as having decisive religious and metaphysical import. It also answers points on which Leibniz 
was pressed by correspondents during his own lifetime. René Joseph de Tournemine, another Jesuit, 
complained to Leibniz in 1703 that his metaphysics failed to give a convincing account of substance. In 
a discussion of the union between soul and body, Tournemine states: 
It is necessary to find a principle which demonstrates that there is between these two substances 
not only of harmony, and of correspondence; but also a link [liaison] and an essential 
dependence: a union not only moral and ideal, dependent on an arbitrary law, but real and 
effective: a union of possession and of ownership, and not only of habitation or usage… In a 
word, there must be a principle which shows that there is between such a body and such a soul, a 
relation [rapport] that is natural, essential and necessary.31 
Blondel draws particular attention to what he describes as « la méditation secrète » appended to the 
crucial letter of 5 February 1712, published for the first time by Gerhardt. In a crucial paragraph, 
Leibniz delineates a material universe preserved in existence by divine power. He states: 
God does not regard only single monads and the modifications of each, but also their relations, 
and it is in that which consists the reality of relations and true reality... But besides these real 
relations is one more perfect, which from a multiplicity of substances produces a new one. And 
that will not be a simple result, that is to say, will not consist in true or real relations alone, but 
will add a new substance, which will not be only the effect of divine understanding, but also of 
divine will... And it is in that which consists the metaphysical bond of the soul and body, which 
constitutes a single suppositum, for which one finds an analogy in the union of natures in Christ. 
And these are the elements which make a being one in itself, or a unique suppositum.32 
This union of the soul and body does not inhere only in the human person. Leibniz, a good Aristotelian 
in his understanding of soul, states in the roughly contemporaneous Monadology that every composite 
substance has a soul in the sense of a general perception or appetite which makes it a source of its own 
internal actions.33 
Blondel therefore finds highly suggestive Leibniz’s comparison of this new substance resulting 
from divine will which unifies composite substances in Christ, and links this directly with Leibniz’s 
eucharistic theology. He states in a paper for Pierre Teilhard de Chardin: 
The question raised by Leibniz and des Bosses concerning transubstantiation during the 
Eucharist leads us to conceive of Christ, without detriment to the constituent monads, as the 
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bond which makes substantiation possible, the vivifying agent for all creation: vinculum 
perfectionis.34 
In a French resumé of his thesis published in 1930, Blondel regards Leibniz’s failure fully to appraise 
the metaphysical implications of the vinculum to be the principal shortcoming of his philosophy. 
Blondel contends: 
Despite so much effort to make with his bond a superior being, a vivifier, a single explanation, 
Leibniz brought forth scarcely more than a stillborn, even less, a neutral expression, a sort of 
peg, something simultaneously extrinsic and dependent; whereas he needed to produce a 
transcendence immanent to all that it causes, animates and binds together from inside, a sort of 
form of goodness and perfection. In so doing, he falls again under the conceptual yoke that he 
has wished and believed himself to have surpassed, yet still remains halfway to liberation.35 
Blondel protests that neither correspondent fully recognized the significance of the doctrine of the bond 
of substance: 
Neither des Bosses nor Leibniz himself gave to the perspective half-opened by the vinculum the 
importance that it could and should assume if it is necessary to reorganize all first philosophy as 
a function of this doctrine, which is nothing if not its goal and coronation.36 
The action of the vinculum substantiale extends, Blondel now argues, far beyond the eucharist: ‘It is 
thus nature in its entirety and the whole of metaphysics that is called into question by the theory of the 
vinculum.’37 
The purpose of the thèse secondaire—which, until the early twentieth century, had to be 
produced in Latin in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the prestigious doctorat d’état—was to 
expound a historical aspect of the longer thèse principale, in which Blondel developed his philosophy of 
action.38 The latter became far better known, but its genesis has been largely overlooked. Blondel 
himself described his philosophy of action as the oak which grew out of the acorn planted by Leibniz.39 
His argument in De vinculo substantiali that substance is ultimately dependent on divine action is 
similar to his better-known presentation in L’Action of the same essential intuition that the phenomenon 
of human action implies and requires the insinuation of something absolute to motivate it. This shows a 
clear parallelism between the unification of eucharistic substance by an absolute principle, and the 
unification of the divided will in action by the absolute.40 Blondel defines action as a ‘synthesis of 
willing, knowing and being, that bond of the human composite which cannot be cut without destroying 
what has been torn apart’, and states that action ‘naturalizes the absolute in the relative itself’.41 He later 
describes the bond in explicitly christological terms as the ‘union which constitutes us, this bond which 
we will from ourselves to Him as He willed it from Himself to us’.42 Blondel finally refers his 
discussion of the bond of action back to its origins in eucharistic transformation in the Leibniz–des 
Bosses correspondence:  
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Literal practice must be like a ferment that leavens little by little, by an imperceptible progress, 
all the weight of the members. Once we begin to entertain within ourselves this vivifying force, 
a slow work of transubstantiation and conversion takes place in our carnal mass, in our desires 
and in our appetites.43 
Action effects, in other words, a similar change in the human person as does the bond of substance in 
the eucharist, transforming the person and the larger world of which they are part. Blondel also 
describes, however, the wider consequences of human action for the world eucharistically. He states: 
Just as a piece of bread becomes, by a word, the living Christ, so do our actions, by a right and 
noble intention, construct the mystical body of God. It is by them that the world in its entirety 
must be transubstantiated: this miracle is directly fulfilled only in the eucharist, to teach us also 
to transfigure, to supernaturalize the smallest grain of wheat, the most lowly of our 
occupations.44 
Blondel, it must be remembered, was neither ordained nor a member of any religious order. Comments 
such as these reveal that a crucial part of his project was to develop a renewed sense of the significance 
of the eucharist for lay people, which far from prescinding from transubstantiation, adopts it as the 
model for the material transformation which all Christians are called to effect through their daily work 
in the world. 
Blondel had wished to conclude his trilogy Philosophy and the Christian Spirit with a volume 
giving a systematic account of the social, political and educational principles which would inform this 
daily work, but did not live to complete it.45 His advocacy of social catholicism is, however, evident 
more episodically. Employing the pseudonym of Testis, or ‘witness’, Blondel mounted a sustained 
defence of social catholicism against its detractors in a series of seven articles in the Annales de 
philosophie chrétienne.46 This formed part of his patronage of a pioneering programme of Christian 
education created to bring theological reflection to bear on a pressing social and economic question: the 
Semaines Sociales.47 Convened in a different French city each year, their aim was to bring together 
professionals, workers, clergy, students and other interested parties to reflect on the selected topic under 
the aegis of leading academics and practitioners. Blondel had earlier been the teacher of Marc Sangnier, 
founder of the pioneering catholic social movement Le Sillon, and had been involved in the 
establishment of his movement by contributing to its political journals, conferences, education and other 
projects.48 
Blondel’s striking rhetoric directed against the caustically secularist Third Republic philosophes 
should not lead to the conclusion that his position is inherently anti-philosophical. He argues, in 
contrast, that reflective action, in encountering and transcending progressively wider horizons, becomes 
compelled to assent to the activity of an absolute principle motivating it, which he identifies with God. 
The theological reasoning associated with this ascent does not, he makes clear, supplant the philosophy 
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which has preceded it: ‘Far from all the rungs used to ascend to complete life having to be discarded as 
passing means, man completes his role by grounding absolutely the universal reality with which action 
has been nourished.’49 Indeed, Blondel substantially redrafted the final chapter of L’Action between his 
thesis defence and its publication in order to guard against antimetaphysical interpretations.50 He is thus 
impelled beyond both immanentist realism and idealism, demonstrating the insufficiency of a purely 
immanentist metaphysics, yet finding in the acknowledgement of the phenomenality of beings the 
‘solidity of the being who sees them and makes them all what they are’.51 
 
REALITY AND THE PHENOMENON IN MODERN CATHOLIC THEOLOGY 
 
It would scarcely be possible to overstate the tremendous impact of Blondel’s philosophy of action on 
French catholic theology in the twentieth century. Apart from its formative influence on social 
catholicism already discussed, it was instrumental in Henri de Lubac’s revolutionary theology of the 
surnaturel. The latter possesses clear Leibnizian connotations. Recent catholic teaching on the grace–
nature relation has, moreover, restated essentially Blondelian perspectives. Fides et Ratio alludes openly 
to Blondel in its reference to ‘others’ who ‘produced a philosophy which, starting with an analysis of 
immanence, opened the way to the transcendent’ and acknowledges the practical autonomy of 
philosophy in relation to doctrine.52 Yet the concrete and eucharistic setting which Blondel provided for 
his philosophy is rarely acknowledged. Christians must not become forgetful of the roots of the church 
as community and its social action in the substance of the eucharist transforming the world and granting 
it renewed consistency. 
De Lubac absorbed Blondel’s philosophy of action during his three years of study at the Jesuit 
philosophy scholasticate on Jersey, where the reading of Blondel’s works was permitted though not 
encouraged, first meeting him in 1922.53 On 3 April 1932 he wrote to Blondel with reflections on the 
surnaturel for what would later become his seminal eponymous work. Of particular interest is de 
Lubac’s discussion in parts of his later work of Blondel’s allusions to the concept of pure nature, which 
de Lubac critically stated ‘needs to be taken up again in its entirety’.54 
Central to de Lubac’s theology is an attempt to re-establish a relational understanding of nature 
and supernatural action as linked and interdependent. The critique of Jansenism formed a key point of 
departure for his own seminal Surnaturel as it did for Leibniz.55 From de Lubac’s Leibnizian 
perspective, Jansenist theology amounted to a curious iteration of the faults of the high scholasticism 
which it purported to oppose. He protests that Jansenius ‘sees the grace of God now reigning over the 
ruins of a nature formerly master of itself’, believes that only a small number of arbitrarily chosen 
people are elected to be saved, seeks to exclude all philosophical reasoning from theology, and 
maintains that grace totally masters the will, which becomes its tool.56 These positions, when taken in 
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combination, amount to a comprehensive denial of the harmony between grace and nature, and because 
they completely separate the two, also deny the real, intimate dependence of concrete material nature on 
divine action. 
Leibniz’s correspondence with des Bosses coincided with the final crushing of the Jansenist 
movement. Its last stronghold, the Abbaye de Port-Royal des Champs in Rambouillet, was destroyed in 
1711, and the papal bull Unigenitus Dei filius, condemning 101 propositions from Pasquier Quesnel’s 
Réflexions morales, promulgated in 1713. Leibniz remained neutral in the conflict between the Jesuits 
and Jansenists, even in his correspondence with the Jesuit des Bosses, censuring the harsh polemic and 
brutal violence endemic in it. He nonetheless staunchly opposes some of the more extreme Jansenist 
positions and the notion of extrinsic grace.57 At the same time he challenges a parallel extrinsicism in 
the high scholasticism of the period which regarded the eucharist as purely miraculous, rather than as 
exemplary of the dependence of the whole of material nature on divine action. 
Leibniz wished, like de Lubac, to affirm the harmony of nature and grace and the dependence of 
nature on grace. He was moreover, again like de Lubac, convinced of the religious and even missionary 
import of his metaphysics.58 With de Lubac these concerns become apparent in his opposition to the 
concept of ‘pure nature’, according to which beings in the natural world possess purely natural ends, 
appetites and powers, and are therefore unable to enjoy any form of relation with God.59 Such a view 
had become associated with Thomas Cajetan, whose ideas had gained renewed influence because his 
commentary on the Summa theologiae had been included in the new official critical Leonine edition of 
that work.60 De Lubac protests: 
Nature was made for the supernatural, and, without having any right over it, nature is not 
explained without it. As a result, the whole natural order, not only in man but in the destiny of 
man, is already penetrated by something supernatural that shapes and attracts it.61 
The search for the bond of substance can be seen as an attempt to establish this dependence of the 
natural on the supernatural rather than their coexistence in parallel universes. De Lubac identifies the 
overtly religious character of the vinculum in commending Blondel’s 1930 synopsis of his 1893 thesis 
for its ability to shake the philosopher ‘out of a critical slumber’ and to ‘plunge him into full reality’ by 
directing the human mind ‘towards the restoration of all things in Christ’.62 De Lubac also develops 
Blondel’s ecclesial perspective on the eucharistic bond63: the true significance of the bond, he argues, is 
revealed when divine charity unifies individuals into a single social body of faith and witness sustained 
by the bond love prepared in the eucharist, which anticipates the completion of the universe in Christ. 
He nevertheless remains convinced that ecclesial realism is dependent on sacramental realism, and that 
faith in the ecclesial body can only emerge from faith in the real presence of Christ in the eucharistic 
substance: ‘Eucharistic realism and ecclesial realism: these two realisms support one another, each is 
the guarantee of the other.’64 In one place, de Lubac offers a perspective on the eucharist founded on the 
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notion of the whole of creation being continually transformed in analogical representation of the 
worship of heaven. He states of the eucharist: ‘It is not specifically liturgical. Far from restricting itself 
to describing a ceremony, or a figurative or commemorative act, it reaches out to cover the whole order 
of the Incarnation—unless we prefer to say … that this whole order of the redemptive Incarnation 
should itself be considered as a vast liturgy, the earthly and temporal image of the eternal Liturgy which 
is taking place in Heaven.’65 
Blondel’s philosophy of action made an equally decisive impact on the spiritual resistance of 
French catholics to Nazi occupation via the work of Yves de Montcheuil, whom Étienne Foullioux 
describes as ‘one of the first and the principal propagators of Blondelian thought within francophone 
catholic circles’.66 De Montcheuil describes the implications of the vinculum substantiale for both 
materiality and action in an article of which Blondel stated his great approval.67 Christ, de Montcheuil 
states, is the living bond of the human and the divine, unifying the will and thus making possible 
knowledge of himself as that bond. But Christ is equally the primordial element of the world, the 
firstborn of all creation in whom all things subsist. De Montcheuil’s own life of action culminated in 
martyrdom at the hands of the Gestapo following his capture during a pastoral visit to members of the 
Resistance based near Grenoble. This ultimate priestly sacrifice should not, however, obscure de 
Montcheuil’s concern to involve the whole of the body of the Church in resistance to tyranny through 
his lecturing, clandestine writing and pastoral ministry. The defence of justice is, he states, the duty of 
all people, and especially of all followers of Christ. Social witness must, therefore, be a lay initiative, 
and cannot be left solely to clergy.68 This highly politicized ecclesiology shaped new understandings of 
lay participation in church mission in the aftermath of the war, and re-emerged in adapted form in the 
Vatican Two ecclesiology of Lumen gentium. It is the particular office of the laity, the document 
affirms, to ‘seek the kingdom of God by engaging in temporal affairs and by ordering them according to 
the plan of God’. Yet as with de Lubac, the eucharistic context must not be forgotten. This engagement 
is described in specifically eucharistic terms: ‘As those everywhere who adore in holy activity, the laity 
consecrate the world itself to God.’69 
These observations reveal continuity between a radicalized form of Blondelian social 
catholicism and emerging liberation theology. This movement, or collection of movements, far from 
being founded on secular Marxist ideology, possesses a theological dynamic which appropriates 
Blondel’s theology of action and his concern for the concrete materiality of human life.70 Gustavo 
Gutiérrez assimilated Blondelian insights whilst undertaking his pre-ordination ‘theological grand tour’ 
of Europe during the 1950s, which included periods of residence in Louvain and Lyons,71 where 
Blondel’s ideas were pervasive. In his seminal Theology of Liberation, Gutiérrez identifies Blondel’s 
conception of philosophy as critical reflection on action, and his associated discovery of the ‘historical 
and existential viewpoint’ of the concrete situation as a ‘transnatural’ state, as inspirational to his own 
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new apologetics which defines theology as critical reflection on praxis, describing Blondel as ‘one of 
the most important thinkers of contemporary theology, including the most recent trends’.72 In another 
context, Leonardo Boff appropriates directly the concept of the vinculum substantiale as connecting all 
beings in the universe in a single eucharistic Christ in his ecological preference for the poor.73 Proper 
appreciation of the Blondelian current within liberation theology demonstrates that the validity of the 
latter does not, fortunately, rest solely on the coherence or theological content of Marxist theory.74 
Blondel’s realist interpretation of the later Leibniz might appear quixotic in the face of the 
current power of phenomenology. Heidegger maintains, in his essay on Leibniz in the Wegmarken—
despite citing excerpts from the des Bosses correspondence—that the drive (Trieb) inherent in monads 
confers substantial unity on them, in a movement analogous with the representation and striving of the 
ego in the phenomenal realm, by means of a reaching out which is ecstatic but ultimately finite.75 Gilles 
Deleuze conceives the bond of substance in philosophical terms, yet with suggestive theological 
overtones absent from Heidegger’s discussion. Deleuze draws on the work of the art historian Henri 
Focillon, who identifies the baroque as a tendency to repetition rather than a single historical period, 
associating it with the combination of opposites—privacy and commonality, motion and definition, 
spirit and matter—by means of the image of the ‘fold’, along which these dichotomies are continually 
defined, transcended and redefined. He asserts: 
The essence of the Baroque entails neither falling into nor emerging from illusion but rather 
realizing something in illusion itself, or of tying it to a spiritual presence that endows its spaces 
and fragments with a collective unity.76 
Deleuze identifies Leibniz as the theorist par excellence of the baroque, and there are indeed echoes in 
this statement of Blondel’s discovery of solidity within the phenomenon. Deleuze nevertheless 
interprets the vinculum substantiale as a ‘torsion of the world, an infinite fold ... the exterior or outside 
of its own interiority ... the unlocalizable primary link that borders the absolute interior’. He presents the 
vinculum equivocally as the possession of individual phenomena, whereas it is clear that in Leibniz’s 
own theory the vinculum is able to exist independently of the composite form which it unifies,77 
because it is unity and reality. 
Blondel argues, contra Deleuze, that there is ultimately only one vinculum active in the universe, 
who is Christ, manifested in innumerable different instants. Such an affirmation could be construed in 
negative terms as capitulation to a transignification agenda which invalidly elides crucial and real 
distinctions between sacred and secular. Yet the route by which the affirmation has been reached in this 
essay suggests otherwise. Leibniz develops the concept of the vinculum substantiale because he 
perceives the aporia inherent in any non-theological metaphysics, urging a theological cosmology 
against metaphysical metanarrative. The contrary notion that material reality is entirely separable from 
divine action—or in other words, is really distinct from it—provides the basis for modern scientific and 
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philosophical paradigms divorced from theological reality. Leibniz through Blondel urges a theological 
turn to the concrete which proclaims the contingency and uniqueness of created being and the true 
reality of the phenomenon. 
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